ssl_pkt.c

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/*
 *  OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks
 *             over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based
 *             session authentication and key exchange,
 *             packet encryption, packet authentication, and
 *             packet compression.
 *
 *  Copyright (C) 2002-2024 OpenVPN Inc <sales@openvpn.net>
 *
 *  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
 *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2
 *  as published by the Free Software Foundation.
 *
 *  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
 *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
 *  GNU General Public License for more details.
 *
 *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
 *  with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
 *  51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
 */
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
#include "config.h"
#endif
 
#include "syshead.h"
 
#include "ssl_util.h"
#include "ssl_pkt.h"
#include "ssl_common.h"
#include "crypto.h"
#include "session_id.h"
#include "reliable.h"
#include "tls_crypt.h"
 
/*
 * Dependent on hmac size, opcode size, and session_id size.
 * Will assert if too small.
 */
#define SWAP_BUF_SIZE 256
 
static bool
swap_hmac(struct buffer *buf, const struct crypto_options *co, bool incoming)
{
    ASSERT(co);
 
    const struct key_ctx *ctx = (incoming ? &co->key_ctx_bi.decrypt :
                                 &co->key_ctx_bi.encrypt);
    ASSERT(ctx->hmac);
 
    {
        /* hmac + packet_id (8 bytes) */
        const int hmac_size = hmac_ctx_size(ctx->hmac) + packet_id_size(true);
 
        /* opcode (1 byte) + session_id (8 bytes) */
        const int osid_size = 1 + SID_SIZE;
 
        int e1, e2;
        uint8_t *b = BPTR(buf);
        uint8_t buf1[SWAP_BUF_SIZE];
        uint8_t buf2[SWAP_BUF_SIZE];
 
        if (incoming)
        {
            e1 = osid_size;
            e2 = hmac_size;
        }
        else
        {
            e1 = hmac_size;
            e2 = osid_size;
        }
 
        ASSERT(e1 <= SWAP_BUF_SIZE && e2 <= SWAP_BUF_SIZE);
 
        if (buf->len >= e1 + e2)
        {
            memcpy(buf1, b, e1);
            memcpy(buf2, b + e1, e2);
            memcpy(b, buf2, e2);
            memcpy(b + e2, buf1, e1);
            return true;
        }
        else
        {
            return false;
        }
    }
}
 
#undef SWAP_BUF_SIZE
 
static void
tls_wrap_control(struct tls_wrap_ctx *ctx, uint8_t header, struct buffer *buf,
                 struct session_id *session_id)
{
    if (ctx->mode == TLS_WRAP_AUTH
        || ctx->mode == TLS_WRAP_NONE)
    {
        ASSERT(session_id_write_prepend(session_id, buf));
        ASSERT(buf_write_prepend(buf, &header, sizeof(header)));
    }
    if (ctx->mode == TLS_WRAP_AUTH)
    {
        struct buffer null = clear_buf();
 
        /* no encryption, only write hmac */
        openvpn_encrypt(buf, null, &ctx->opt);
        ASSERT(swap_hmac(buf, &ctx->opt, false));
    }
    else if (ctx->mode == TLS_WRAP_CRYPT)
    {
        ASSERT(buf_init(&ctx->work, buf->offset));
        ASSERT(buf_write(&ctx->work, &header, sizeof(header)));
        ASSERT(session_id_write(session_id, &ctx->work));
        if (!tls_crypt_wrap(buf, &ctx->work, &ctx->opt))
        {
            buf->len = 0;
            return;
        }
 
        if ((header >> P_OPCODE_SHIFT) == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3
            || (header >> P_OPCODE_SHIFT) == P_CONTROL_WKC_V1)
        {
            if (!buf_copy(&ctx->work,
                          ctx->tls_crypt_v2_wkc))
            {
                msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "Could not append tls-crypt-v2 client key");
                buf->len = 0;
                return;
            }
        }
 
        /* Don't change the original data in buf, it's used by the reliability
         * layer to resend on failure. */
        *buf = ctx->work;
    }
}
 
void
write_control_auth(struct tls_session *session,
                   struct key_state *ks,
                   struct buffer *buf,
                   struct link_socket_actual **to_link_addr,
                   int opcode,
                   int max_ack,
                   bool prepend_ack)
{
    uint8_t header = ks->key_id | (opcode << P_OPCODE_SHIFT);
 
    /* Workaround for Softether servers. Softether has a bug that it only
     * allows 4 ACks in packets and drops packets if more ACKs are contained
     * in a packet (see commit 37aa1ba5 in Softether) */
    if (session->tls_wrap.mode == TLS_WRAP_NONE && !session->opt->server
        && !(session->opt->crypto_flags & CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT))
    {
        max_ack = min_int(max_ack, 4);
    }
 
    ASSERT(link_socket_actual_defined(&ks->remote_addr));
    ASSERT(reliable_ack_write
               (ks->rec_ack, ks->lru_acks, buf, &ks->session_id_remote,
               max_ack, prepend_ack));
 
    msg(D_TLS_DEBUG, "%s(): %s", __func__, packet_opcode_name(opcode));
 
    tls_wrap_control(tls_session_get_tls_wrap(session, ks->key_id), header, buf, &session->session_id);
 
    *to_link_addr = &ks->remote_addr;
}
 
bool
read_control_auth(struct buffer *buf,
                  struct tls_wrap_ctx *ctx,
                  const struct link_socket_actual *from,
                  const struct tls_options *opt)
{
    struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
    bool ret = false;
 
    const uint8_t opcode = *(BPTR(buf)) >> P_OPCODE_SHIFT;
    if ((opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3
         || opcode == P_CONTROL_WKC_V1)
        && !tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key(buf, ctx, opt))
    {
        msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
            "TLS Error: can not extract tls-crypt-v2 client key from %s",
            print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
        goto cleanup;
    }
 
    if (ctx->mode == TLS_WRAP_AUTH)
    {
        struct buffer null = clear_buf();
 
        /* move the hmac record to the front of the packet */
        if (!swap_hmac(buf, &ctx->opt, true))
        {
            msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
                "TLS Error: cannot locate HMAC in incoming packet from %s",
                print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
            gc_free(&gc);
            return false;
        }
 
        /* authenticate only (no decrypt) and remove the hmac record
         * from the head of the buffer */
        openvpn_decrypt(buf, null, &ctx->opt, NULL, BPTR(buf));
        if (!buf->len)
        {
            msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
                "TLS Error: incoming packet authentication failed from %s",
                print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
            goto cleanup;
        }
 
    }
    else if (ctx->mode == TLS_WRAP_CRYPT)
    {
        struct buffer tmp = alloc_buf_gc(buf_forward_capacity_total(buf), &gc);
        if (!tls_crypt_unwrap(buf, &tmp, &ctx->opt))
        {
            msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: tls-crypt unwrapping failed from %s",
                print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
            goto cleanup;
        }
        ASSERT(buf_init(buf, buf->offset));
        ASSERT(buf_copy(buf, &tmp));
        buf_clear(&tmp);
    }
    else if (ctx->tls_crypt_v2_server_key.cipher)
    {
        /* If tls-crypt-v2 is enabled, require *some* wrapping */
        msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: could not determine wrapping from %s",
            print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
        /* TODO Do we want to support using tls-crypt-v2 and no control channel
         * wrapping at all simultaneously?  That would allow server admins to
         * upgrade clients one-by-one without running a second instance, but we
         * should not enable it by default because it breaks DoS-protection.
         * So, add something like --tls-crypt-v2-allow-insecure-fallback ? */
        goto cleanup;
    }
 
    if (ctx->mode == TLS_WRAP_NONE || ctx->mode == TLS_WRAP_AUTH)
    {
        /* advance buffer pointer past opcode & session_id since our caller
         * already read it */
        buf_advance(buf, SID_SIZE + 1);
    }
 
    ret = true;
cleanup:
    gc_free(&gc);
    return ret;
}
 
void
free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state)
{
    free_buf(&state->newbuf);
    free_buf(&state->tls_wrap_tmp.tls_crypt_v2_metadata);
    if (state->tls_wrap_tmp.cleanup_key_ctx)
    {
        free_key_ctx_bi(&state->tls_wrap_tmp.opt.key_ctx_bi);
    }
}
 
/*
 * This function is similar to tls_pre_decrypt, except it is called
 * when we are in server mode and receive an initial incoming
 * packet.  Note that we don't modify
 * any state in our parameter objects.  The purpose is solely to
 * determine whether we should generate a client instance
 * object, in which case true is returned.
 *
 * This function is essentially the first-line HMAC firewall
 * on the UDP port listener in --mode server mode.
 */
enum first_packet_verdict
tls_pre_decrypt_lite(const struct tls_auth_standalone *tas,
                     struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,
                     const struct link_socket_actual *from,
                     const struct buffer *buf)
{
    struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
    /* A packet needs to have at least an opcode and session id */
    if (buf->len < (1 + SID_SIZE))
    {
        dmsg(D_TLS_STATE_ERRORS,
             "TLS State Error: Too short packet (length  %d) received from %s",
             buf->len, print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
        goto error;
    }
 
    /* get opcode and key ID */
    uint8_t pkt_firstbyte = *BPTR(buf);
    int op = pkt_firstbyte >> P_OPCODE_SHIFT;
    int key_id = pkt_firstbyte & P_KEY_ID_MASK;
 
    /* this packet is from an as-yet untrusted source, so
     * scrutinize carefully */
 
    /* Allow only the reset packet or the first packet of the actual handshake. */
    if (op != P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2
        && op != P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3
        && op != P_CONTROL_V1
        && op != P_CONTROL_WKC_V1
        && op != P_ACK_V1)
    {
        /*
         * This can occur due to bogus data or DoS packets.
         */
        dmsg(D_TLS_STATE_ERRORS,
             "TLS State Error: No TLS state for client %s, opcode=%d",
             print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc),
             op);
        goto error;
    }
 
    if (key_id != 0)
    {
        dmsg(D_TLS_STATE_ERRORS,
             "TLS State Error: Unknown key ID (%d) received from %s -- 0 was expected",
             key_id,
             print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
        goto error;
    }
 
    /* read peer session id, we do this at this point since
     * read_control_auth will skip over it */
    struct buffer tmp = *buf;
    buf_advance(&tmp, 1);
    if (!session_id_read(&state->peer_session_id, &tmp)
        || !session_id_defined(&state->peer_session_id))
    {
        msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
            "TLS Error: session-id not found in packet from %s",
            print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
        goto error;
    }
 
    state->newbuf = clone_buf(buf);
    state->tls_wrap_tmp = tas->tls_wrap;
 
    /* HMAC test and unwrapping the encrypted part of the control message
     * into newbuf or just setting newbuf to point to the start of control
     * message */
    bool status = read_control_auth(&state->newbuf, &state->tls_wrap_tmp,
                                    from, NULL);
 
    if (!status)
    {
        goto error;
    }
 
    /*
     * At this point, if --tls-auth is being used, we know that
     * the packet has passed the HMAC test, but we don't know if
     * it is a replay yet.  We will attempt to defeat replays
     * by not advancing to the S_START state until we
     * receive an ACK from our first reply to the client
     * that includes an HMAC of our randomly generated 64 bit
     * session ID.
     *
     * On the other hand if --tls-auth is not being used, we
     * will proceed to begin the TLS authentication
     * handshake with only cursory integrity checks having
     * been performed, since we will be leaving the task
     * of authentication solely up to TLS.
     */
    gc_free(&gc);
    if (op == P_CONTROL_V1)
    {
        return VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1;
    }
    else if (op == P_ACK_V1)
    {
        return VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1;
    }
    else if (op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3)
    {
        return VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V3;
    }
    else if (op == P_CONTROL_WKC_V1)
    {
        return VERDICT_VALID_WKC_V1;
    }
    else
    {
        return VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2;
    }
 
error:
    tls_clear_error();
    gc_free(&gc);
    return VERDICT_INVALID;
}
 
 
struct buffer
tls_reset_standalone(struct tls_wrap_ctx *ctx,
                     struct tls_auth_standalone *tas,
                     struct session_id *own_sid,
                     struct session_id *remote_sid,
                     uint8_t header,
                     bool request_resend_wkc)
{
    /* Copy buffer here to point at the same data but allow tls_wrap_control
     * to potentially change buf to point to another buffer without
     * modifying the buffer in tas */
    struct buffer buf = tas->workbuf;
    ASSERT(buf_init(&buf, tas->frame.buf.headroom));
 
    /* Reliable ACK structure */
    /* Length of the ACK structure - 1 ACK */
    buf_write_u8(&buf, 1);
 
    /* ACKed packet - first packet's id is always 0 */
    buf_write_u32(&buf, 0);
 
    /* Remote session id */
    buf_write(&buf, remote_sid->id, SID_SIZE);
 
    /* Packet ID of our own packet: Our reset packet is always using
     * packet id 0 since it is the first packet */
    packet_id_type net_pid = htonpid(0);
 
    ASSERT(buf_write(&buf, &net_pid, sizeof(net_pid)));
 
    /* Add indication for tls-crypt-v2 to resend the WKc with the reply */
    if (request_resend_wkc)
    {
        buf_write_u16(&buf, TLV_TYPE_EARLY_NEG_FLAGS); /* TYPE: flags */
        buf_write_u16(&buf, sizeof(uint16_t));
        buf_write_u16(&buf, EARLY_NEG_FLAG_RESEND_WKC);
    }
 
    /* Add tls-auth/tls-crypt wrapping, this might replace buf with
     * ctx->work */
    tls_wrap_control(ctx, header, &buf, own_sid);
 
    return buf;
}
 
hmac_ctx_t *
session_id_hmac_init(void)
{
    /* We assume that SHA256 is always available */
    ASSERT(md_valid("SHA256"));
    hmac_ctx_t *hmac_ctx = hmac_ctx_new();
 
    uint8_t key[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
    ASSERT(rand_bytes(key, sizeof(key)));
 
    hmac_ctx_init(hmac_ctx, key, "SHA256");
    return hmac_ctx;
}
 
struct session_id
calculate_session_id_hmac(struct session_id client_sid,
                          const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,
                          hmac_ctx_t *hmac,
                          int handwindow, int offset)
{
    union {
        uint8_t hmac_result[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
        struct session_id sid;
    } result;
 
    /* Get the valid time quantisation for our hmac,
     * we divide time by handwindow/2 and allow the previous
     * and future session time if specified by offset */
    uint32_t session_id_time = ntohl(now/((handwindow+1)/2) + offset);
 
    hmac_ctx_reset(hmac);
    /* We do not care about endian here since it does not need to be
     * portable */
    hmac_ctx_update(hmac, (const uint8_t *) &session_id_time,
                    sizeof(session_id_time));
 
    /* add client IP and port */
    switch (from->addr.sa.sa_family)
    {
        case AF_INET:
            hmac_ctx_update(hmac, (const uint8_t *) &from->addr.in4, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
            break;
 
        case AF_INET6:
            hmac_ctx_update(hmac, (const uint8_t *) &from->addr.in6, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
            break;
    }
 
    /* add session id of client */
    hmac_ctx_update(hmac, client_sid.id, SID_SIZE);
 
    hmac_ctx_final(hmac, result.hmac_result);
 
    return result.sid;
}
 
bool
check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,
                      const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,
                      hmac_ctx_t *hmac,
                      int handwindow)
{
    if (!from)
    {
        return false;
    }
 
    struct buffer buf = state->newbuf;
    struct reliable_ack ack;
 
    if (!reliable_ack_parse(&buf, &ack, &state->server_session_id))
    {
        return false;
    }
 
    /* check adjacent timestamps too */
    for (int offset = -2; offset <= 1; offset++)
    {
        struct session_id expected_id =
            calculate_session_id_hmac(state->peer_session_id, from, hmac, handwindow, offset);
 
        if (memcmp_constant_time(&expected_id, &state->server_session_id, SID_SIZE))
        {
            return true;
        }
    }
    return false;
}